International Relations, Hegemony and the ICC by Elisa, Orrù

Istituto Universitario
di Studi Europei
International relations, hegemony and the ICC
Elisa Orrù
Power, law and consent
The relationship between power, law and consent is a key feature of the Western debate 
on criminal law. On the one side, defining the legitimate ways of exercising the punitive 
power has been a critical question since the Enlightenment thought onwards and especially 
as to the rule of law doctrine. On the other side, the role played by public punishment in 
shaping consent and its communicative potential have been crucial questions for critical, 
as well as non-critical approaches to criminal law in contemporary thought.
These questions gain in strength and radicalism when it comes to international criminal 
law (ICL). In this case the filter of the state is not present anymore to mediate between 
power,  law and consent,  and the  power to  punish individuals  is  directly  exercised  by 
international institutions.
This means, on the one hand, that traditional justifications of the power to punish and 
which are elaborated on in the domestic sphere are not useful anymore in legitimating 
international punishment. International criminal norms are not framed by an international 
democratically  elected  parliament,  and their  exercise  is  not  controlled  by the complex 
system of checks and balances typical of the rule of law. On the other hand, having not 
being  created  by  a  sovereign,  international  criminal  law  cannot  be  conceived  as  an 
instrument to build or consolidate consent around the sovereign. A double-sided dilemma 
therefore arises: traditional explanations are no longer apt to answer the question whether 
ICL is legitimate,  while ICL itself  can no longer be considered an instrument to build 
consent around the traditional power exercising it, namely the state.
Although I consider both sides of the dilemma equally interesting and stimulating, I 
will  focus  here only on one side of  the  coin:  the ability  to  build consent  of  the  ICL 
institutions,  and in  particular  the  International  Criminal  Court  (ICC)1. In  other  words, 
instead of asking whether the consent around the ICC is broad enough for the Court to be 
considered legitimate,  I shall  ask whether the ICC is able to build consent around the 
world order it embodies.
The concept  of  hegemony,  I  will  argue,  is  a  useful  heuristic  tool  to  apprehend the 
relationship between power, law and consent as to the ICC. This does not mean, however, 
that the existence of a hegemonic function of the ICC can be easily affirmed.
I will first clear the meaning of “hegemony” I will refer to, as it has been developed by 
neo-gramscian and post-colonial thinkers. I shall then focus on contemporary international 
criminal  tribunals  in order  to contextualise  the concept  of hegemony relating  to them. 
Finally,  I  will  ask  whether  international  criminal  tribunals  are  effective  in  producing 
consent.
1I have dealt with the question of the justification of international criminal tribunals elsewhere, see E.  
Orrù,  Il  tribunale  del  mondo.  La  giustificazione  del  diritto  internazionale  penale:  analisi,  critica,  
alternative, con Prefazione di Danilo Zolo, Libri di Emil, Bologna, 2010 and E. Orrù, M. Ronzoni, Which  
Supranational Sovereignty? Criminal and Socioeconomic Justice Compared, in “Review of International 
Studies”, XXXV (2011), 7, pp. 2089-2106.
Working Papers Series
Diplomacy and Security in
Europe
1
Istituto Universitario
di Studi Europei
Hegemony
One can distinguish between a ‘weak’ and a ‘strong’ meaning of the term “hegemony”.
The  ‘weak’  meaning  corresponds  to  the  common  use  of  the  word  and  means  a 
dominance of one entity over others. In this sense it is sometimes used in reference to 
international relations when referring to the dominance of one state over the others, such 
as Robert Keohane's theory of hegemonic stability, or as a euphemism for “imperialism”.2
The ‘strong’ meaning of “hegemony” relates to the use first made by Antonio Gramsci 
and later  developed by Gramscian  interpreters  and post-colonial  scholars.  This  second 
meaning refers to a sort of political direction which implies consent from the part of those 
who are directed. In the ambiguous use of the term made by Gramsci himself, hegemony 
may or may not also imply the use of force, but it always refers to a form of power in  
which consent prevails over force. A critical function needed by hegemonic direction in its 
strong meaning consists of organising, widening and consolidating consent towards the 
dominant forces. This function aims at presenting their world view as universal, and is 
exercised through public institutions such as schools, the judicial system, other official 
state powers, as well as through organisations of the civil society such as trade unions, 
cultural organisations, the press etc.3
Here I will refer to hegemony in this second strong meaning, for the relationship it 
underlines  between  power,  institutions  and  consent,  enables  one  to  apprehend  critical 
features of the ICC.
Scholars such as  Robert Cox and Bhupinder S. Chimni have  elaborated on Gramsci's 
concept of hegemony in order to apprehend supranational relations and have stressed the 
role  of  international  law  and  international  institutions  in  performing  the  hegemonic 
function at the supranational level.
Cox picks  up on Gramsci's  intuition  that  hegemonic  institutions  and ideologies  are 
“universal in form. i.e. [sic!], they will not appear as those of a particular class, and will  
give some satisfaction to the subordinate groups while not undermining the leadership or 
vital interests of the hegemonic class”.4 This implies, according to Cox, that hegemony at 
the global level not only relies on the organisation of inter-state relations, but also involves 
the global extension of a particular mode of production and the emergence of a global civil 
society,  i.e. a global net of the social classes which profit from the dominant mode of 
production.  In other words, a hegemonic world order not only encompasses a political 
structure, but an economic and social structure as well. In a global hegemonic order, the 
dominant state(s) do not deliberately exploit the others; on the contrary most of the latter 
find the global order convenient for them too. Accordingly, the norms which regulate the 
hegemonic global order are expressed in universal, not particularistic terms.
2Robert  O.  Keohane,  After  Hegemony.  Cooperation  and  Discord  in  the  World  Political  Economy, 
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 20052.
3See Antonio Gramsci, Quaderni dal carcere, Torino, Einaudi, 20073, a cura di Valentino Gerratana, Q 1 
§§ 44, 46, 48, Q 4 § 49 and Q12 §1, Q 6 § 81 and Q 12 § 1; Giuseppe Cospito, Egemonia, in Fabio Frosini e 
Guido Liguori (a cura di), Le parole di Gramsci. Per un lessico dei Quaderni del carcere, Roma, Carocci, 
2004, pp. 74-92 and Robert W. Cox, Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: an Essay in Method, 
in  Stephen  Gill  (ed.  by),  Gramsci,  Historical  Materialism  and  International  Relations,  Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 49-66.
4R. W. Cox, Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations, cit., p. 58.
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Cox is particularly interested in explaining how international institutions can sustain a 
particular world order through universal norms. In his opinion, international organisations 
are at the same time a product and an instrument of a hegemonic world order. On the one 
hand  their  creation  is  generally  sustained,  if  not  directly  initiated,  by  the  hegemonic 
state(s),  who also secure the consent  of  other  states.  International  organisations  at  the 
beginning  tend  to  reflect  existing  power  relationships  and  to  present  a  world  image 
consistent  with  them.  On  the  other  hand,  international  organisations  embody  and 
legitimate  the norms of the world order.  They apply and function according to norms 
which are favourable to the dominant economic, political and social forces, but also make 
subordinate forces accept them as legitimate. They attain this goal by making concessions 
to subordinate interests without questioning core power relationships and by presenting 
the  dominant  forces  as  serving  the  general  interest.5 In  Cox's  own  words:  “In  the 
hegemonic  consensus,  the  dominant  groups  make  some  concessions  to  satisfy  the 
subordinate  groups,  but  not  such  as  to  endanger  their  dominance.  The  language  of 
consensus is a language of common interest expressed in universalist terms, though the 
structure of power underlying it is skewed in favour of the dominant groups”.6
Chimni is likewise concerned with explaining the hegemonic potential of international 
institutions and of international law generally.
In accordance with Gramsci's and Cox's analyses, Chimni argues that “dominant social 
forces in society maintain their domination not through the use of force but through having 
their worldview accepted as natural by those over whom domination is exercised […]. The 
language  of  law  has  always  played,  in  this  scheme  of  things,  a  significant  role  in 
legitimizing  dominant  ideas  for  its  discourse  tends  to  be  associated  with  rationality, 
neutrality, objectivity and justice”.7 This is true also at the global level: “International law 
is no exception to this rule. It legitimizes and translates a certain set of dominant ideas into 
rules and thus places meaning in the service of power”.8
According to Chimni, international law today is undergoing a set of transformations 
which  are  reshaping  its  relationship  with  states.  Such  processes  are,  for  instance,  the 
intervention  of  international  law in  defining  the  internal  organisation  of  the  state;  the 
international regulation of property rights, commodities exchange and currencies policy; 
the association of the internationalisation of the human rights discourse with the property 
rights  discourse;  the  internationally  prescribed  deregulation  of  the  labour  market;  the 
increasing  complexity of  the  jurisdiction  concept  and the proliferation  of  international 
courts; the affirmation of non-state subjects involved in international law making; and, 
finally, the refusal to consider development inequalities among states as relevant factors in 
defining international norms.
According to  Chimni,  these  transformations  perpetuate  power relationships  because 
they sustain the dominant coalition of social forces and states and have a different impact 
5R. W. Cox,  Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations, cit. and  Cox,  Social forces, States and  
World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory, “Millennium – Journal of International Studies”, 10 
(1981), 2, pp. 126- 154,  137
6R. W. Cox, Labor and Hegemony, “International Organization”, 31 (Summer, 1977), 3, pp. 385-424, p. 
387.
7B. S. Chimni,  Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto, “International Community 
La Review, 8 (2006), pp. 3-27, p. 15.
8Ibidem.
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on Third World states and peoples. International institutions are playing a key ideological 
role in legitimating these transformations, for they sustain and promote a particular way of 
intending international law. Firstly international institutions contribute to the promotion of 
international norms functional to the realization of their objectives. Secondly, they play a 
key role in identifying problems that matter and in suggesting solutions to them, through 
prescribing paths for states’ actions as well as for normative developments. Finally, they 
assess the adequacy of states’ policies from their points of view. In doing this, they are 
directed by the hegemonic forces, express their interests, and perpetuate the North-South 
divide. Nevertheless, they present their mandate as committed with universal interests.
To sum up, for these authors,  an international  institution has a hegemonic  function 
when its activity is presented as serving universal interests and perceived as legitimate by 
subordinate groups, while in fact it perpetuates asymmetrical power relationships.
In the following I ask if this can be considered the case for the ICC.
Before looking at the ICC, however, a preliminary question must be addressed: Which 
powers can be considered the hegemonic forces in our present international context? This 
is of course a very complex question that cannot be systematically addressed here. Cox's 
and Chimni's analysis suggest that contemporary hegemonic forces consist of a mixture of 
state and non-state actors. On the one level there are Western capitalistic societies guided 
by  the  United  States;  on  the  other  the  “transnational  capitalist  class”,  based  in  the 
advanced  capitalist  societies  and  allied  with  elites  in  Third  World  countries.  For  the 
particular characteristics of international criminal law, which is strictly intertwined with 
sovereignty  questions,  I  suggest  here  to  focus  only  on  state  actors,  leaving  open  the 
question whether my analysis can also be extended to non-state actors. I will assume the 
hegemonic actors in the contemporary international arena are the group of states that can 
be  identified  economically  as  advanced  capitalistic  societies,  culturally  as  broadly 
belonging to the Western civilization, and politically as implementing a liberal-democratic 
system.  Geographically,  such  states  are  those  of  the  North  American  and  European 
continents.  There are  many expressions  to refer  to  them as a  whole:  Chimni  uses  for 
example  the  expressions  “Northern  -”  or  “First  World”.  I  will  refer  to  them  as  the 
“Western World” or “Western societies”.
In the name of the international community
There is no doubt that the ICC claims to operate in the name of the whole international 
community and to protect its universal interests.
The ICC is  conceived  not  as  acting  to  protect  interests  of  one  state  menaced  in  a 
particular situation, but as concerned with violations that at each time they are committed 
affect the whole international community. According to the ICC Statute the crimes under 
the ICC jurisdiction “threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world”, and are “of 
concern to the international community as a whole.”9
9Rome  Statute  of  the  International  Criminal  Court  (later  on  Rome  Statute or  ICC  St),  UN Doc. 
A/CONF.183/9,  1998,  preamble.  This  is  common  also  to  other  international  criminal  tribunals.  The 
International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Annual Report of the year 1997, for instance, 
affirms  that  “The  Tribunal's  mission  is  [...]  to  dispense  justice  [...]  in  the  name  of  the  international  
community.”  Similar statements are to be found also in the sentences of the international tribunals. The 
ICTY Appeal  Chamber  declared  for  instance  in the  Aleksovski  case  that  retribution,  which the Camber 
considers an important factor of the punishment, «is not to be understood as fulfilling a desire for revenge 
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In accordance with these statements legal scholars identified the core of the universally 
shared  interests  and  values  in  goods  like  the  “peace,  security  and  well-being  of  the 
world.”10 International crimes threaten these universal basic values: this is the reason why 
their punishment is of concern to the whole international community and they ought to be 
judged by international, possibly universal, courts. As Kai Ambos states it, “the protection 
of  fundamental  legal  values  of  human  beings  and  the  international  community  [...] 
justifies, to a great extent, the recognition of an international duty to punish.”11
Accordingly to its universalistic claim, the ICC made efforts in order to encourage the 
widest  participation  of  states  and  to  present  itself  as  an  impartial  an  independent 
institution.
I.
Since the time of its creation, the ICC was presented as a universal body. Its creation 
was  not  decided  in  a  closed  circle  of  states,  but  was  discussed  in  an  international 
conference convoked by the UN General Assembly in 1998 in Rome, which was open to 
all states, of which 160 participated in . It was the UN codification conference with the 
highest number of participating states. This was also made possible by a trust fund at the 
disposal  of  the  delegations  with  limited  budgets.  Consistently  with  the  universalistic 
aspiration of the Rome Conference, the states parties created the ICC “conscious that all 
peoples are united by common bonds, their cultures pieced together in a shared heritage”.12
II.
The Rome Statute provides also for election mechanisms of the judges sensitive to legal 
pluralism. Article 36 (7) and (8) require that the judges' election by the Assembly of States 
parties must allow the principal legal systems of the world to be represented in the ICC, 
and  that  there  must  be  an  equitable  geographical  representation  as  to  the  judges' 
provenance. Similar criteria should be also respected in the employment of staff at the 
Prosecutor's and Registar's offices.13
but as duly expressing the  outrage of the international community at these crimes».  Similarly,  the ICTY 
Trial Chamber in the Erdemović  case, stated that  «One of the purposes of punishment for a crime against 
humanity lies precisely in stigmatising criminal conduct which has infringed a value fundamental not merely 
to a given society, but to humanity as a whole» In the Kambanda case, the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR) expressed the meaning that international punishment should show “that the international 
community was not ready to tolerate the serious violations of international humanitarian law and human 
rights”.  Pros. v Aleksovski, IT-95-14-1/A,  24 March 2000, par. 185; Pros. v Erdemović, IT-96-22-T, Trial 
Chamber, Sentencing Judgement, 29 novembre 1996, par. 64; and  Pros. v Kambanda, ICTR 97-23-S, 4th 
September 1998, par. 28. See also Pros. v Babić, IT-03-72-S, cit., e Pros. v Obrenović, IT-02-60/2-S, Trial 
Chamber Section A, Sentencing Judgement, 10  December 2003, par. 50.
10Rome Statute, cit., preamble.
11See Kai  Ambos (with the assistance  of Christian.  Steiner),  On the Rationale of  Punishment at  the  
National and International Level, in Marc Henzelin and Robert Roth (ed.),  Le droit pénal à l’épreuve de  
l’internationalisation, Paris, Lgdj-Georgéd-Bruylant, 2002, pp. 305-323.
12Rome Statute, cit., preamble.
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The Statute, quite obviously, affirms also the need for the ICC itself, the judges, the 
prosecutor and the other personnel of the court to be of “impartiality” and “integrity” and 
dispose that they are not allowed to engage in other employment or activities which could 
interfere with their impartiality.14
Officially, the ICC is not subordinated to any other organisation, including states, the 
ONU  and  its  Security  Council.  The  regular  financing  of  the  Court  is  assured  by 
contributions of the states parties;15 every state's financing quota is fixed according to an 
assessment scale that take into account the differing levels of economic development. It 
seems, then, that the ICC is financially dependent only on those states that are themselves 
subjected to the Court's jurisdiction.
III.
The ICC seems moreover to recognise the equal sovereign right and duty of every state 
to deal with the cases it has jurisdiction over. The principle of complementarity, stated in 
the preamble and in art. 1 of the ICC Statute and regulated by art. 17, establishes that the 
ICC is a last-resort court, and that it will not intervene if a state is already conducting 
investigations or prosecutions on a particular case, unless the state is unwillingly or unable 
to conduct the trial. Such a principle might be seen as intended to protect states against 
“imperialistic” interventions by the Court. 
IV.
Finally,  as  to  the  area  submitted  to  the  ICC jurisdiction,  formally  the  ICC Statute 
admits inequalities based only on the will of the interested states. In the “standard” case 
according to  the Rome Statute,  the ICC can exercise  its  jurisdiction  only over crimes 
allegedly committed by persons who are citizens of a state party,  or committed on the 
territory of a state party. In this sense, the ICC Statute seems to put all states on the same 
level, and to be able to intervene only when the states who have naturally jurisdiction on a 
case have ratified the court's Statute16. However, as we will see in the next paragraph, this 
is only a part of the story.
Are  the  mentioned  features  of  genuine  universalistic  characters,  or  are  they  rather 
“concessions” made to weak states in a hegemonic perspective, which in no way diminish 
power inequalities and the privileges of the “strong” states?
13Art. 44 (2) ICC St. Art. 112 (3)(b) provides for similar criteria for the election of the members of the 
Assembly of States Parties' Bureau.
14Preamble, art. 36 (3)(a), art. 40, art. 42 (5) and (7), art. 44 (2) and art. 45 ICC St.
15Art. 115 (a) ICC St.
16Art. 12 ICC St.
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In the interest of whom?
I.
As to the Rome Conference, although many countries could afford to participate in the 
conference thanks to the trust fund, they did not take part on an egalitarian foot. During 
the conference many informal working groups were created to deal with particular topics 
related to the ICC Statute. Due to the small number of some delegations' members, these 
were not able to take part in all meetings. Moreover, the informal meetings took place in 
English without translation services, although the United Nations official languages are, 
besides English, Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian and Spanish.
II.
The ICC Statute, as we have seen, also provides for rules for the judges election which 
should guarantee an equal representation of the different juridical systems of the world. 
However, the means adopted by the ICC to respond to international crimes are expressions 
of the Western juridical and political culture. Its criminal law norms mix common-law and 
civil-law  elements  (with  predominance  of  the  former)  and  require  national  and 
international proceedings to conform to the fair trial model.
This judicial system is an expression of a tradition which is deeply rooted in Western 
culture,  and  which  is  inseparable  form  its  theoretical-philosophical  presuppositions. 
Among them are the tradition of political individualism, Enlightenment, the rule of law 
theory and the  Rechtsstaat  doctrine.  The penal  system adopted  by the  ICC and these 
traditions are strictly intertwined: the legal norms applied by the ICC are expressions of a 
particular culture and are not derived from the different legal systems of the world in an 
equitable manner.
Different ethical and legal traditions are not considered as valuable alternatives to the 
Western criminal model. Alternative models, however, do exist: procedures inspired by 
the restorative justice model, for instance, have been applied in response to international 
crimes  in  several  countries.  Restorative  justice  is  a  response to  crime that  focuses  on 
restoring the losses suffered by victims, holding offenders accountable for the harm they 
have  caused,  and building  peace  within  communities,  without  necessarily  holding  the 
perpetrator  criminally  responsible.  The  South  African  Truth  and  Reconciliation 
Commission is an example of such an approach. South Africa’s proposal to recognise this 
model  as  an  alternative  to  criminal  procedures  was  however  rejected  during  the 
negotiations which led to the creation of the ICC. Other options, like the gacaca courts 
employed  in  Rwanda  in  response  to  the  genocide  of  1994  which  combine  penal  and 
restorative elements, were not even taken into account.
In this context, even if the ICC judges come from different world regions, they have no 
choice but to apply the Western-originated criminal law model.
As we have seen, moreover, the Rome Statute affirms the need to guarantee the Court's 
and its personnel's independence.
The financing mechanism of  the Court  seems to handle  fairly  with economic  gaps 
between nations, and at the same time to make the Court’s financial resources dependent 
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only on those states which are subject to its jurisdiction. This is true, however, only for the 
cases that are opened after referral of a States party or as a consequence of the prosecutor's 
initiative.
For the cases referred to the ICC by the Security Council (the third available triggering 
mechanism for the Court) the Rome Statutes allow the Court to also be financed by funds 
from the United Nations. Moreover, for all cases the Court can be financed by voluntary 
contributions from states, individuals and organisations.17 Firstly,  this means that states 
which  are  not  themselves  parties  can  contribute  to  finance  the  court.  Secondly,  this 
regulation exposes the Court to the risk of financial dependence on one or more “rich” 
states, parties or non parties to the ICC that can make over proportioned contributions 
poor states could never afford.18
It is worth mentioning, finally, that states can also offer to the Court gratis personnel to 
be employed by it.19
III.
The abovementioned factors have important consequences as to the supposed neutrality 
of  the  Court  towards  power  differences  among  states,  which  could  descend  from the 
principle of complementarity interpreted as a principle reaffirming the equal sovereignty 
of states, i.e. an equal juridical status independent from their power position.
Firstly,  the  Court's  option  for  a  western-style  criminal  proceeding,  considered  the 
standard and unique model  to be applied,  has a different  impact on Western and non-
Western  states.  It  is  evident  that  the  Rome  Statute's  preconditions  for  exercising  its 
jurisdiction  -  the  unwillingness  or  inability  of  the  competent  state  to  conduct  a  trial 
according to the ICC's standards - are more easily fulfilled when a non-Western state is 
involved. All the more because according to art. 17 of its Statute the Court has the last 
word in deciding if the requirements are met.
Concerns  as  to  how Indian criminal  proceedings  would  be judged by the  ICC, for 
instance, has played a role in India's decision not to ratify the ICC statute, since the Indian  
criminal system departs from the Western criminal model adopted by the ICC in many 
respects.20
Secondly, given the financing rules and the enormous costs of the ICC, a big gap as to 
the  impact  of  Third  World  and  First  World  States  on  the  Court's  founding  is  to  be 
supposed.  The ICC budget  for  2011 is  103,607,900 €,  almost  6% of  the  UN regular 
budget, and 35% of the UN Development Programme net budget estimated for the same 
17Art. 13-15, 115 (b) and 116 ICC St.
18This is a quite likely possibility, for the same happened to the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).  Although the ICTY statute established that the Tribunal had to be financed 
through the  UN ordinary funds,  the UN General  Assembly decided later on to finance the tribunal also 
through  voluntary  contributions  by  States  and  organisations.  As  a  consequence  of  that  the  ICTY  was 
overwhelmingly financially and logistically supported by the US, with important negative consequences on 
its impartiality. See Art. 32 of the ICTY Statute. See also D. Zolo, Invoking Humanity. War, law and global  
order, London, Continuum, 2002.
19Art. 44 (4) ICC St.
20 Usha Ramanathan, India and the ICC, “Journal of International Criminal Justice”, 3 (2005), pp. 627-634.
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year.21 And this notwithstanding the fact that nine years after the beginning of the Court's 
activity, 16 persons are accused by the Court, yet only trials against eight of them can be 
celebrated,  for  the  remaining  accused  are  still  at  large.  The  ICC trials  appear  then  a 
“justice for the rich”, whose enormous costs can only be sustained by well-off states.
IV.
Notwithstanding the claim to respect states' equal sovereignty, the ICC Statute allows 
the Security Council's members, and the permanent ones in particular, to make the Court 
function as an ad hoc tribunal. If the Security Council decides to refer a case to the ICC, 
and if the Court decides to open an investigation on the case, then the preconditions for the 
exercise of the Court's jurisdiction do not need to be met. This means that the Court can 
deal with cases involving crimes allegedly committed by citizens of states not party to the 
ICC Statute, and committed on the territory of a state non-party to the statute. Although 
the Security Council refers to Chapter VII of the UN Charter in submitting a case to the 
ICC, , thus claiming to deal to protect international peace and security, it is evident that it 
perpetuates  power  inequalities  among  states.  The  Security  Council  members,  without 
themselves having to be subject to the Court's jurisdiction, can decide that other states, 
which also did not accept the Court's jurisdiction, will be nevertheless subjected to it. 
The ICC's practice
All  the  unequal  characters  of  the  ICC  described  above  have  led  to  impressive 
consequences as to the partiality of the Court's activity so far. 
The ICC has  focused only on cases  involving central  African  states,  each of  them 
bordering on at least one of the others, i.e. Central African Republic, Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, Uganda, Sudan, Kenya and Libya.22
On the other hand the ICC refused to open investigations on alleged crimes committed 
by the “International Coalition” (composed of Australia, Poland, the UK, and the USA) 
during the war waged against Iraq in 2003. The Court received several referrals, most of 
which denounced that the use of cluster bombs by the Coalition forces resulted in war 
crimes. Although the Court had at least jurisdiction over war crimes committed by citizens 
of the UK, the Prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, refused to open an investigation. He 
explained this conclusion arguing that the information he possessed “did not allow for the 
conclusion that  there was a  reasonable basis  to believe that  a  clearly excessive attack 
within the jurisdiction of the Court had been committed”, and that the number of civilian 
victims of the reported facts would be too low to justify the intervention of the Court. 
21Assembly of States parties Concludes its Ninth Session, ICC Press Release, 11/12/2010, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ASP/Press+Releases/Press+Releases+2010/Assembly+of+States+Parties+concludes+its+nint
h+session.htm,  last  visited  24/03/2011;  UN  General  Assembly  Resolution  64/244,  04/03/2010, 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/64/resolutions.shtml,  last  visited  24/03/2011;  and  Executive  Board  of  the  UN 
Development  Programme and of  the UN Population Fund,  UNDP Budget  Estimates  for the 2010-2011  
Biennium, Report of  the Administrator,  DP/2010/3,  www.undp.org/execbrd/pdf/dp2010-3.pdf,  last  visited 
24/03/2011.
22As to the latter two states, the ICC opened investigations, but not yet a case.
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Later  on,  the Prosecutor  stated that  the Court's  intervention would not be appropriate, 
because the UK was already dealing with the fact, but he did not supply any further details 
regarding the national prosecutions.23
In March 2011 indeed, the United Kingdom made the largest single voluntary financial 
contribution so far to the ICC Victims Trust Fund.24
The ICC, moreover, has not yet opened any investigation on the facts related to Israel's 
attack against the Gaza strip in December 2008. Palestine, as well as Israel, is not party to 
the Rome Statute, but in January 2009 the Palestinian authority accepted the jurisdiction of 
the Court with an ad hoc declaration, in accordance to art. 12 (3) of the ICC Statute. The 
Office of the Prosecutor argues that preliminary questions must be cleared, most of which 
have  to  do  with  the  uncertain  legal  status  of  Palestine  statehood  and  the  Palestinian 
National Authority's criminal jurisdiction on the Gaza strip.25 It seems likely,  however, 
that the power positions of Palestine and Israel have played a central role in preventing 
Court's intervention so far.
On this  background, the activity of the ICC can be considered an example of what 
Chimni calls  the “language of blame”,  through which “the North seeks to  occupy the 
moral  high  ground through representing  the  third world peoples,  in  particular  African 
peoples, as incapable of governing themselves”.26
What can serve this aim more than a criminal law which presents itself as impartial and 
universal, yet in fact concentrates on violence in African states and occults the crimes and 
human rights violations committed by Western States? The language of blame of ICL has 
gone as far as to incriminate chiefs of states on duty, such as Omar Hassan Al-Bashir, the 
current President of Sudan, accused at large before the ICC. On the other side the ICC 
excluded  from  its  activity  every  case  that  could  prove  the  responsibility  of  Western 
powers in committing international crimes, such as those in the case of the International 
Coalition's attack against Iraq.
23See  Report  of  the  International  Criminal  Court,  A/61/217,  3rd August  2006,  http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Reports+on+activities/Court+Reports+and+Statements/Court+Reports+and+Statements.
htm (last visited on 27th May 2009), par. 31. Once again, this has a precedent in the ICTY. The ICTY did not 
investigate on the NATO bombing campaign over Yugoslavia in 1999, although it received several referrals 
on killing civilians and bombing civilian targets,  like the Chinese Embassy and the TV headquarters  in 
Belgrade. The ICTY had full jurisdiction over the alleged crimes, but the prosecutor, at that time Carla Del  
Ponte,  “concluded that  there were no grounds to open an investigation”.  Annual Report of  ICTY,  2000, 
summary. Extensive documentation on the topic can be found in Michael Mandel, How America gets Away  
with Murder. Illegal Wars, Collateral Damage and crimes Against Humanity, London, Pluto Press, 2004, 
pp. 177-206.
24United Kingdom Makes Contribution to Trust Fund for Victims, ICC Press Release 21/03/2011, ICC-
TFV-20110321-PR645,  http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/united
%20kingdom%20makes%20contribution%20to%20trust%20fund%20for%20victims?lan=en-GB,  last 
visited 25/03/2011.
25Office  of  the  Prosecutor,  Situation  in  Palestine,  03/05/2010,  http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/ 
D3C77FA6-9DEE-45B1-ACC0-B41706BB41E5/282852/  PALESTINEFINAL201010272.pdf,  last  visited 
25/03/2011  and  Sixth  Report  of  the  ICC to  the  United  Nations  for  2009/2010,  A/65/313,  19/08/2010, 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/reports%20on%20activities/court%20reports%20and%20statements/sixth
%20report%20of%20the%20international%20criminal%20court%20to%20the%20united%20nations%20for
%202008_2009,  last visited 25/03/2011.
26B.S. Chimni, Third World Approaches to International Law, cit.
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The  ICC,  thereafter,  sustains  a  world  representation  in  which  grave  human  rights 
violations are a prerogative of non-Western states, while Western states are the promoters 
of a global rule of law based on respect for human rights.
Europe in particular, with its strong and in-bulk support to the ICC, gains from this 
world representation, notwithstanding, for instance, the participation of many European 
States to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and  the migration politics of the EU and of  
many of its member states, which have been leading to serious human rights violations.
As to the US, although they refused to ratify the ICC Statute, their position toward the 
Court is not as negative as it might appear at first sight. The US are not completely against 
the ICC; on the contrary they support it whenever it can be used as an ad hoc tribunal, i.e. 
when there are  guarantees  that  it  will  be concerned with a  specific  case and will  not 
prosecute US citizens.
The presumed hostility towards the ICC consisted in acts aimed at assuring immunity 
to the US citizens: they made pressure in the UN Security Council to release resolutions 
excluding  the  jurisdiction  of  the  ICC on  foreign  personnel  involved  in  peacekeeping 
missions, and persuaded more than 100 states, partly also recurring to economic pressure, 
to  sign  bilateral  agreements  to  prevent  the  extradition  of  US  citizens  to  the  ICC.27 
However  they  did  support  the  ICC activity  in  particular  cases  and  when  the  Court's 
jurisdiction  over  US citizens  where  excluded.  For  instance  they  supported  both  cases 
referred to the ICC by the Security Council, namely Sudan and Libya, while they could 
have  prevented  the  referral  by  their  veto.  In  both  cases  they  made  sure  the  Security 
Council's resolutions excluded the ICC jurisdiction over personnel of states non-party to 
the ICC.28
It seems then that the US are also profiting from the world view sustained by the ICC.
The ICC: a hegemonic institution?
Given  that  the  ICC  attempt  to  present  a  particular  West-centred  world  view  as  a 
universal one, is then the hegemonic attempt of the ICC successful? Is the ICC accepted as 
a legitimate institution also by non-Western states?
The geographical distribution of the states which accepted its jurisdiction suggests a 
few observations.  Among the 114 states  that  ratified the Rome Statute,  The European 
Region is the most represented one, with 41 states being members of the ICC. On the 
contrary, entire regions of the globe are still hardly represented, such as the North-African 
and Middle-East regions and Asia, with only two states from these regions, Jordan and 
Tunisia, having ratified the statute. China, the most populous country of the world, has not 
ratified the ICC Statute, nor has India.
It seems, then, that the effort of the ICC to build consent around the world view it 
sustains among non-Western states has not been successful. The only exception to this is 
South America: almost all Latin American and Caribbean States, indeed, have ratified the 
ICC Statute.
As to the attitude towards the activity of the Court on particular cases , the fact that 
three  African  States  (Central  African  Republic,  Democratic  Republic  of  the  Congo, 
27AMICC,  Chronology  of  US-Actions  Related  to  the  International  Criminal  Court,  04/03/2011, 
www.amicc.org/docs/US%20Chronology.pdf, last visited 31/03/2011.
28SC Res 1970 (2011), 26/02/2011, § 6, and Sc Res 1593 (2005), § 6.
Working Papers Series
Diplomacy and Security in
Europe
11
Istituto Universitario
di Studi Europei
Uganda) referred their situations themselves to the ICC, can be considered a signal in the 
opposite direction.
In  other  cases,  however,  the  opposition  to  the  Court  from non-Western  states  has 
become open.
For  instance,  the  decision  of  the  ICC  to  incriminate  Sudan's  President  Al-Bashir 
provoked in-bulk reactions by the Arab League and the African Union, whose leaders 
refused to accept the decision of the Court and declared that they would not cooperate 
with the Court by arresting or extraditing Al-Bashir.29 At an African Union meeting the 
Sudanese foreign minister declared: “We think that Africa is now one front against the 
ICC... Most Africans believe it is a court that has been set up against Africa and the third  
world”.30 Many  African  Member  States  of  the  ICC,  moreover,  considered  a  mass 
withdrawal from the Court as a consequence of the Court's indictment of Al-Bashir.31
The ICC hegemonic attempt seems consequently not to have reached its goal so far.
Will the revolutions in North Africa and the Middle East changes as to the non-Western attitude 
towards the ICC? The first repercussions are already visible: one of the first undertakings of the new 
Tunisian government was to ratify the ICC statute.
29Regional  rifts  stymie  Arab  summit,  BBC  News,  30/3/2009, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7971255.stm, last visited 07/05/2009 and Appeal over Al Bashir Genocide  
Charges, Al Jazeera English, 08/07/2009, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa, last visited  20/07/2009.
30  AU Criticised over Bashir Decision, Al Jazeera English, 04/07/2009,  http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa, 
last visited 20/07/2009.
31African  ICC  Members  Mull  Withdrawal  Over  Bashir  Indictment, 
http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2009-06-08-voa30-68788472.html,  Voice  of  America, 
08/06/2008, last visited 29/03/2011.
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